Calls for changes to fire-related building regulations as well as revelations that cladding was replaced with a cheaper version on Grenfell Tower has flooded our site with comments. Here are a selection.
This seems to be a smoke screen trying to divert attention. Should Building Control be made to physically test products being used?
The cladding used had a Class O fire rating, which means the product must have been tested at some point. If the cladding now does not meet the test for Class O either the product has changed since the test, or it was a “bad test”. Either way this is where the issue lies in my mind.
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I do not know the testing process, but this too would need looking into, as I don’t understand how something with this rating burned so well. Possibly the testing process is not vigorous enough?
There are many questions to be answered, but I think his comments are avoiding the real issues.
Russ Fairhurst
David Strong’s comments that Building Control bodies are competing with each other to achieve sign off is ludicrous – they are responsible for compliance not testing.
The blame for this terrible incident must lie with the decision makers, the local authorities for allowing flammable materials to be fitted to high-rise buildings, politicians for voting against sprinkler systems and ill-equipped fire and rescue, designers for specifying this material when it is clearly banned in commercial sectors.
What testing has the BRE done on these materials in such situations?
Mike Underwood
This catastrophe is partly the result of the poor training the construction industry has been subjected to over many years where the emphasis has been on process at the expense of product knowledge. The degree of outsourcing right through the delivery chain has also exacerbated this problem.
John Ralph
This building was designed in the seventies when standards would have included the provision of a dedicated alternative means of escape for the occupants. If it didn’t have a secondary stair exit then the design responsibility becomes a matter of conscience for the architect, planning officer, chief building inspector and chief fire officer at the time.
The quite unbelievable signage by whoever, to quote, “STAY PUT” and put a blanket under the door in case of fire is absolute negligence. Hands up those who authorised this pathetic instruction. Eighty men women and children have died a horrible death due to total incompetence of individuals both past and present.
Benjamin Sewell
Why am I not surprised – I hope the contractors and the boss of the council aren’t sleeping and feel very guilty. Some people make you sick all to line their own pockets. Deepest sympathy to all the families this affected so sorry for your loses.
Rich W
From experience in ‘cost cutting’ exercises pre-contract it would be unusual to compromise safety for cost, but without seeing what information was passed between the parties we should not be too quick to judge one party or another, leave it to the experts. Hopefully lessons can be learned from this tragedy.
Sheila
At the end of the day the government is guilty of negligence, the manufacturer, the client or client’s representative, the contractor, project manager, all the way down the chain. CDM Regulations are quite clear. Everyone should know the rules, no one should be involved that are not fully qualified, trained to professional standards and able to act in an advisory capacity. This tragedy cannot be swept under the carpet, or should not be.
Image: Wikipedia
