Am I alone in thinking that something has gone terribly wrong in the follow up to the Grenfell Tower disaster? The event was bad enough but what has followed is quite shocking. As builders we should have a voice in this matter.
In summary; on 14 June 2017 a major fire broke out at Grenfell Tower and many lives were lost. The whole event was followed on television by the nation.
What has happened since; an enquiry has been set up, now of approximately two years’ duration that has achieved what? Absolutely nothing! There is an overwhelming need to get to the root of the cause and handling of the event so that lessons may be learned and measures taken to prevent reoccurrence. But no such thing has happened.
What has happened? The usual suspects have been dusted off:
- The social context of high-rise housing has been fully aired – very worthwhile but not actually the priority here.
- The “sprinkler brigade” are having a field day – we all know that sprinklers are a vital tool but only achieve specific tasks. And would not have made a significant difference here.
- Quality control is “the cause”. I happen to think, after a lifetime managing major projects, that the industry has a major problem with quality control and I would wish to have my time over again to address this. But this is not the issue.
- The fire service are being pilloried. And, frankly they have much to answer for. The “place of refuge” policy of making people sit tight simply does not work.
- The use of a cladding material that emits a flammable goo when heated is bad, but it is not the issue.
So what should we learn from this event? I have not been to the site, I have not been to the inquiry. But I feel I know quite enough to be sure of the issues.
Anyone who has done their school physics has learned that “heat rises”. You learn about the way fuel burns and the “chimney effect”. We all know, if we have lit solid fuel fires, how to get the chimney drawing.
Also, anyone who has spent time in the company of architects on design and build projects discussing and examining fire compartmentation and fire stops in cladding is aware of the measures that must be taken to prevent spread of fire. These measures have the force of law.
You just have to look at the film of the event to know that the designers and specifiers of the Grenfell cladding system got it completely wrong. They effectively specified the perfect chimney around the tower and filled it with flammable materials with no effective fire breaks whatsoever. To add to this, window pods created from UPVC material just made the picture worse. One could not have invented a more perfect fire hazard.
Do I have an axe to grind in this matter? I have to own up to that one. Now retired, but having spent a lot of time as a design and build project manager, I lost count of the number of times the “professionals” presented designs that were fundamentally flawed. The school roof that blew off just missing a class of kids, the balcony that sagged, near collapsing, when the concrete slab was cast on it, the car park that subsided due to wrong specification, the steel frame that “could not be built” costing six months delay and £1m. All these after the designs had been queried.
We know what went wrong. We don’t need another couple of years looking in the wrong places.
John Burgis MCIOB (retired)
